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How might we understand Jonathan Franzen’s Freedom (2010) as a post-9/11 novel, 
in a substantive rather than a trivially chronological sense? Although it does not focus 
on the terrorist attacks directly, Freedom does explore the aftermath of ‘the great 
national tragedy’ (Franzen 2010: 28) of 9/11, as it intersects with the attempts of its 
characters to, in one of the novel’s refrains, figure out how to live. Considerable 
discursive attention is given to the national mood and social ontology of Bush-era 
America; of the ‘Siamese-twin fundamentalisms of Bush and bin Laden’ the novel’s 
emphasis is very much upon the Bush administration’s ‘years of high-tech lying and 
manipulation’ (332-3). Freedom implies that, as Franzen puts the matter elsewhere, 
‘the worse damage to the country was being done not by the pathogen but by the 
immune system’s massive overresponse to it’ (Franzen 2012: 152), or by what one of 
the novel’s characters refers to as ‘Bush II, the worst regime of all’ (Franzen 2010: 
205). 
For Joey Berglund, young Republican leaning son of Walter, the immediate 
effect of 9/11 is to induce an uncharacteristically ‘clueless’ act (Franzen 2010: : 248). 
In his second week at university, Joey leaves his roommate Jonathan watching news 
coverage of the terrorist attacks on television and rushes to an economics lecture – 
only to find, unsurprisingly, a near empty lecture hall. If this misjudgement awakens 
in Joey the sense that ‘a really serious glitch had occurred’, the glitch involves his 
own personal narrative as much as any broader narrative of national identity, 
interrupting as it does numerous exceptionalist assurances heretofore that ‘his life was 
destined to be a lucky one’ (Franzen 2010: 247). This clueless act prepares the ground 
for ‘his intensely personal resentment of the terrorist attacks’, engendering a sense of 
anger whose ‘specific object refused to come into focus’: not quite bin Laden, but 
instead ‘something deeper, something not political, something structurally malicious, 
like a bump in a sidewalk that trips you on your face when you’re innocently out 
walking’ (Franzen 2010: 248). 
The difficulty of bringing political concerns ‘into focus’ experientially, their 
inseparability from personal concerns that are no less easy to focus, and no less 
bumpy, becomes a key preoccupation of the novel. Clashing with his liberal leftist 
father Walter, for instance, Joey finds himself ‘experiencing a hurt that felt structural, 
as if he and his dad had each chosen their politics for the sole purpose of hating the 
other’ (Franzen 2010: : 428). How much weight should be given to this experience? It 
might be considered that this moment rather inverts the task of novelistic realism, 
disclosing the structuring effect of the personal upon the political rather than vice 
versa. The ‘as if’ here will become important, signalling as it does the novel’s wish to 
implicate personal and familial relationships with the political without ceding a sense, 
not of their autonomy exactly, but of their own density and logic. Freedom is 
somewhat invested in the idea of ‘something deeper, something not political’, rather 
than regarding such depths as illusory. 
Joey’s dislocation, the suspension of his feelings of entitlement and potency, 
begins to be remedied only as he fastens his sense of self to the flawed justificatory 
narratives woven around the invasion of Iraq. Watching the assault on Baghdad on 
Fox News, he ‘feels his long-standing resentment of 9/11 beginning to dissolve. The 
country was finally moving on, finally taking history in its hands again, and this was 
somehow of a piece with the deference and gratitude that Blake and Carol showed 
him’, impressed as they are by his involvement with the think tanks responsible for 
planning the post-invasion reconstruction of Iraq (Franzen 2010: 420). This 
involvement is aligned in the narrative with Joey’s romantic pursuit of his 
roommate’s sister, Jenna (a name he associates, excitedly, with the Bush daughters), 
with a further estrangement from his father, and with his ongoing attempt to fashion a 
hard self in contrast to a liberal softness linked in his mind to his father and to 
masturbation: ‘Jenna excited him the way large sums of money did. He knew 
perfectly well that Jenna was bad news. Indeed, what excited him was wondering if 
he might become bad enough news himself to get her’ (Franzen 2010: 411). 
As the political narratives justifying the invasion are discredited and cynically 
revised – from an emphasis on removing weapons of mass destruction to a deep if 
newfound concern for the liberty of the Iraqi people – and as Joey begins to feel 
sickened by the ethically flawed profiteering of reconstruction, another self begins to 
emerge. As Jenna had early intuited, in any case, Joey was ‘way too nice’ Franzen 
2010: 295) for the predatory financial world he aspired to enter. His ethical epiphany 
is accompanied by the (somehow touchingly reluctant) recognition of the depth of his 
commitment to his girlfriend and future wife Connie, ‘his caughtness in a story larger 
than himself’ (Franzen 2010: 431), but this newly felt story is personal rather than 
political. Somewhat inconveniently and, in literary critical terms, unfashionably, 
Franzen has Joey discover something approaching a core self or personality: ‘This 
wasn’t the person he’d thought he was, or would have chosen to be if he’d been free 
to choose, but there was something comforting and liberating about being an actual 
definite someone, rather than a collection of potentially contradictory someones’ 
(Franzen 2010: 459). Joey is thereby exempted, mercifully, from the thankless task of 
‘Performing Identity in a Multivalent World’, the satirical title Franzen gives to an 
academic colloquium attended by Patty and Jessica. For Joey, ‘[t]he world 
immediately seemed to slow down and steady itself, as if it, too, were settling into a 
new necessity’ (Franzen 2010: 459), an experience (including the ‘as if’) which 
captures something of the tone and aspiration of Franzen’s novel. 
Freedom gives more attention to the impact of 9/11 on Joey than to any of its 
other characters. His involvement as a college student with national defence 
contractors, however, selling obviously inadequate spare vehicle parts to the military, 
has been seen as straining credibility, threatening to undo the novel’s realism. Aine 
Mahon notes ‘the unlikeliness of a university student being trusted with a military 
commission amounting to tens of thousands of dollars’ – an opinion shared by Walter 
– and finds this representative ‘of the occasional strain on Franzen’s socially realist 
ambitions’ (Mahon 2014: 99). The strain is understandable. Mark Greif is in 
agreement that the book’s ‘memorializing’ of the reconstruction of Iraq makes 
Freedom ‘temporarily, absurd’, but finds this to be less a failure of the novel than of 
the period it sets on record. For Greif, Joey’s scheme is realistic precisely because it is 
‘cartoonish’, capturing the brazen ‘infamy’ of the profiteering at work in the 
reconstruction of Iraq, a disaster which ‘interrupts the novel, rather than elevating it’, 
since having little do with novelistic nuance (Greif 2010: 129). 
Joey is not the only character in the novel to feel ethically compromised or 
complicit, not the only misplaced self. Freedom is much interested in the politics of 
popular music and the aestheticization of everyday life, from the mindless banality of 
mainstream rock (as rendered by Walter, ‘Gotta be free, so free, yeah, yeah, yeah. 
Can’t live without my freedom, yeah, yeah’ (Franzen 2010: : 154)) to the twee 
sincerity of an indie scene ‘in harmony with consuming’ (Franzen 2010: 392) and the 
reactionary political implications of the iPod. As a founder member of punk band The 
Traumatics, it might be expected that Richard Katz would be all too familiar with a 
wilfully self-sabotaging logic of futility and impurity – hard to sell out from within a 
punk form which already foregrounds its own complicity as a constitutive part of its 
anger. The commercial success of his alternative country album Nameless Lake, 
however, is distasteful to Katz, leading as it does to such ‘traumatic events’ as  ‘(1) 
receiving a Grammy nomination, (2) hearing his music played on National Public 
Radio, and (3) deducing, from December sales figures, that Nameless Lake had made 
the perfect little Christmas gift to leave beneath tastefully trimmed trees in several 
hundred thousand NPR-listening households’ (Franzen 2010: 204). The freedom 
afforded by this success leaves Katz close to suicide, ‘his psychic gills straining 
futilely to extract dark sustenance from an atmosphere of plenitude and approval’ 
(Franzen 2010: 205). 
According to Patty Berglund’s account, this mainstream success, however 
distasteful to Katz, leaves Walter with feelings of rejection and hurt that lead him to 
belittle his own accomplishments working for a nature conservancy. These feelings 
underwrite what Patty presents as an act of competition, on Walter’s part, as he starts 
to work from within a mainstream establishment in ways that are similarly (but far 
more) problematic in their complicity: ‘Within weeks of the release of Nameless 
Lake, he was flying to Houston for his first interview with the megamillionaire Vin 
Haven […] It was obvious to Patty, if not to Walter himself, that his resolve to go to 
Washington and create the Cerulean Mountain Trust and become a more ambitious 
international player was fuelled by competition’ (Franzen 2010: 198). Katz, indeed, 
does experience ‘envy’ of Walter for his ‘taking on Bush’s cronies and trying to beat 
them at their own game’ (Franzen 2010: 231); undoubtedly, though, this is also an 
authorial settling of scores on Patty’s part: acutely conscious of her own tendency to 
compete, she feels that Walter is less frank about his own competitiveness. Walter’s 
attempt to do environmental good by working with rather than against the coal 
industry leaves him no less compromised than Joey, and he shifts his political 
energies instead to an anti-population growth agenda, an agenda that, albeit in 
different ways, proves no less problematic. 
The interminably problematic or fraught character of Walter’s political 
convictions is symptomatic of the novel’s response to the alarmist response of the 
Bush administration to 9/11. It is a response at once confident and uncertain – a 
composite that is evident in the novel’s very form. Around a third of Freedom 
consists of an autobiographical document, ‘Mistakes Were Made’, written by Patty at 
the suggestion of her St. Paul therapist. Patty describes the document to Joey in 
flippant terms as ‘a little creative-writing project, for my own amusement’ (Franzen 
2010: 260); it certainly proves ‘compelling and transformative’ (Franzen 2010: 487) 
for Walter, first in a negative sense, as he learns of Patty’s affair with Richard, and 
secondly in a more positive sense, as the ‘Conclusion’ to her project, ‘A Sort of 
Letter’ to Walter, sparked by Katz’s suggestion that she tell Walter ‘a story’, helps to 
write into being their eventual reconciliation. As Greif argues, just as a significant 
portion of the novel is presented as psychotherapy, Freedom itself can be regarded as 
‘a work of therapy on deep unarticulated crises of America, but a cure at odds with 
the “culture of therapy” that is just supposed to make you happy’ (Greif 2010: 130). 
Distinguishing between an Americanized and a Viennese Freud, the former 
‘acknowledging hidden impulses and undoing neuroses by talk’, the latter drawing 
attention to the inescapably problematic nature of desire which holds ‘danger in both 
directions – towards restraint and freedom’ (Greif 2010: 129), Greif contends that 
neither Freud wins out in Franzen’s novel. For Walter and Patty, for instance, sexual 
expression is at once necessary and inadequate for happiness. Patty’s therapeutic 
narrative is productive of sorrowful wisdom rather than happiness, involving as it 
does reconciliation to reality rather than fantasy (whether personal or national). 
Writing of Franzen’s previous novel, The Corrections, and grouping it 
together with contemporary novels comparable in their conspicuous deployment of a 
recognisably realist mode, Richard Gray has suggested that ‘to label these novels 
realistic, because of their attention to the empirical details of a particular society and 
individual psychology, is to say what is probably the least interesting about them’ 
(Gray 2011: 67). Critical discussion of Freedom, however, has found Franzen’s 
realism to be of considerable interest. In some quarters, the novel’s reception has been 
marked by a certain sense of gratitude. This gratitude was in part directed to its ability 
to voice and entangle the empirical details and psychological vicissitudes of its 
contemporary moment; the New York Times review, for instance, enthused that 
Franzen ‘seems to gather up every fresh datum of our shared millennial life’ – a 
gathering up that might contribute to or conjure the sense of an otherwise fractured 
life as shared (Tanenhaus: 2010). The idea, moreover, that the white middle-aged 
subject has only to voice its discontents for a sense of reality to be restored is one that 
Freedom feels at once drawn to and repelled by. Interestingly, Franzen himself has 
cautioned against what he dubbed the literary critical ‘Fallacy of Capture’, ‘as if a 
novel were primarily an ethnographic recording’ (Franzen [2002] 2004: 259). The 
caution was meant to trouble the premise that a certain kind of formal innovation is 
required in order to represent newness. It is not the case for Franzen, for instance, that 
‘our situation as suburbanized, gasoline-dependent, TV watching Americans is still so 
new and urgent as to preempt old-fashioned storytelling’ (Franzen [2002] 2004: 259) 
– particularly since the experimental strategies of postmodernisn, for instance, are 
now somewhat old-fashioned themselves. Nonetheless, the caution holds for realist 
novels too and, as if in awareness of the fallacy of capture, the same reviewer also 
lamented that Freedom ‘abounds in journalistic detail, some of it slapdash’ 
(Tanenhaus: 2010). It might be added that the novel’s adherence to a certain kind of 
accessible realism, or ‘old-fashioned storytelling’ not only leaves it vulnerable to 
middlebrow touches, but also renders its more literary moments as interestingly 
isolated and conspicuous. This is true, for instance, of the novel’s description of Joey 
as ‘alone with his body; and since, weirdly, he was his body, this meant he was 
entirely alone’ (Franzen 2010: 414), with its echoes of David Foster Wallace’s 
syllogistic style. 
The gratitude characterising Freedom’s reception welcomed its apparent 
demonstration, as if in reassurance, that a certain type of realist novel might still be 
possible, and might speak of and to its moment in ways that unsettle as well as 
comfort and stabilise. Franzen’s own, critically informed essays in part prepared the 
ground for this emphasis on realism. His apparent privileging of ‘contract’ over 
‘status’ novels, for instance, privileging readerly pleasure over writerly 
experimentation, can be taken to imply an allegiance to a familiar realism as against 
more avant-garde modernist and postmodernist literary modes, however we might 
then want to blur such labels (Franzen [2002] 2004: 240). If Franzen’s work is 
difficult then, as he puts it in another context, this difficulty is less a matter of formal 
difficulty than ‘the difficulty of life itself’ (Franzen [2002] 2004: 269). The novelist 
and critic Benjamin Kunkel has associated Franzen’s novelistic practice with what he 
refers to as a  
 
new self-conscious traditionalism, a preference among many sophisticated 
writers and critics for what are felt to be tried-and-true ways of doing things. 
For the novel, this means endorsing a relatively high degree of sentimentality, 
as against the chilly affect of someone like DeLillo or Brett Easton Ellis; a “well 
rounded” approach to characterization, as against a previously avant-garde 
commitment to the evasiveness or speciousness of robust personal identity; and 
an acceptance of all the artificial contrivance involved in the plotting associated 
with Dickens, say (Kunkel 2000). 
 
Freedom may fairly safely be identified as an instance of what Kunkel tentatively 
terms the ‘perennial novel’. If such novels give an impression of ‘glacial stability’ in 
the face of a rapidly changing culture, however, that impression may be misleading, 
since this very stability may be taken to indicate the fundamental openness of the 
novel as a form ‘to new historical content – new ways of talking, eating, and dressing, 
along with new technologies, manners and beliefs’ (Kunkel 2000). Richard Gray has 
argued that ‘some kind of alteration of imaginative structures is required to register 
the contemporary crisis’ of 9/11 (Gray 2011: 29-30). Kunkel implies that, in principle, 
the perennial novel as a form may still register crises through its openness to new 
historical content. This openness need not be understood, moreover, in terms of 
uncritical passivity; if the realist novel lends stability to the world it describes, this 
might be taken as a condition of critique as against a reification of the social world. 
Franzen has described Freedom as an explicitly political novel, sharply critical, for 
instance, of the new ways of talking and technologies of Bush era America. Freedom 
is ‘open’ to these developments in the sense that it meditates upon their nature in 
resistant, uncertain ways; if such resistance is then subject to the twin threats of irony, 
on the one hand, and snowballing, destabilising ‘omnidirectional anger’ on the other 
(Franzen 2010: 313), this is suggestive less of an absence of conviction and more of 
the self-questioning burdens of liberal subjectivity. 
Gratitude for the achievement of a realist novel, further, is internally related to 
gratitude for the continued viability of the novel as such, lent salience by a sense that 
the culture at large has become inimical to the good of the novel. Franzen has written 
of how his ‘impulse to defend the novel … is stronger than ever’:  
 
Freedom was conceived and eventually written in a decade where language was 
under as concerted an assault as we’ve seen in my lifetime. The propaganda of 
the Bush administration, its appropriation of words like freedom for cynical 
short-term gain, was a clear and present danger. This was also the decade that 
brought us YouTube and universal cell-phone ownership and Facebook and 
Twitter. Which is to say: brought us a whole new world of busyness and 
distraction. So the defense of the novel moved to different fronts. Let’s take one 
of those buzzwords, freedom, and try to restore it to its problematic glory. Let’s 
redouble our efforts to write a book with a narrative strong enough to pull you 
into a place where you can feel and think in ways that are difficult when you’re 
distracted and busy and electronically bombarded (Burn 2010).  
 
If the perennial novel, as realised by Franzen, can resist this assault on language, it 
does so not by contrast with a discourse of purity but with a discourse whose 
authenticity is secured precisely through the transparency of its contested and 
uncertain nature, its ‘problematic glory’. At the same time, the novel form – its ‘way 
of talking’ – is presented here in more confident terms as in some way resistant to a 
state of distraction and busyness associated with new technologies, as providing or 
restoring a location allowing for forms of feeling and thought that are otherwise 
endangered – it is hard not to draw a link here between Franzen’s concern for the 
novel and Walter’s conservationist concerns. The novelist and critic David Shields 
provides such a link, contending that Franzen’s traditionalism is self-conscious in the 
sense of mannered, the forms of feeling and thought it elicits essentially those of 
‘nostalgic entertainment’ (O’Hagan 2010). Shields might agree that Freedom’s 
affective and cognitive properties differentiate it from a distracted culture, only now 
in the negative sense that its ‘antediluvian’ mode ‘fails to convey what it feels like to 
live in the 21st century’ (O’Hagan 2010). It might be felt that Shield’s intervention in 
itself is somewhat nostalgic, reprising as it does debates between realism and 
postmodernism, a reprisal that functions to reinforce rather than question the novel’s 
relevance. 
If, as Kunkel reminds us, Franzen’s traditionalism is wholly self-conscious, 
then perhaps the forms of thinking and feeling elicited by Freedom should not be 
understood as automatically conferring anything other than problematic glories. What 
kind of self-consciousness is at stake here? Drawing on Stephen Burn’s account of 
Franzen’s work as in dialogue with postmodernism, Mahon contends that Freedom is 
self-conscious in the sense of self-reflexive. Mahon thereby troubles Richard Rorty’s 
opposition between cynical-experimental and patriotic narratives, finding Freedom to 
be both at once (Mahon 2014). Margaret Hunt Gram, meanwhile, argues that the 
political questions taken up by Freedom are variously occluded and stifled both by the 
mechanisms of realism and by Franzen’s investment in a reader centred, contract 
model of novelistic production: ‘In the world of Freedom, growth capitalism’s 
ecological and material depredations […] are allowed to become visible only insofar 
as their visibility promises not to threaten the novel’s own market value. They can 
show only so much of themselves as Freedom’s imagined readers will fail to notice’ 
(Hunt Gram 2015: 309-310). 
Near the end of Freedom, Walter Berglund’s Canterbridge Estates neighbours 
are said to detect a ‘political trembling in his voice’ (Franzen 2010: 576). This is a 
trembling that Freedom in some way shares. Resisting her hopes that he reconcile 
with his wife Patty, Walter acknowledges to their daughter Jessica: ‘I know you want 
a happy ending’ (Franzen 2010: 508). Franzen’s novel does supply its readers with 
something approaching this happy ending, in that Walter and Patty reconcile, and its 
characters attain chastened insight (although the matter of Jessica’s happiness is 
somewhat in question, given that she is dedicated like her father to a ‘declining and 
unprofitable enterprise’, albeit now ‘literary publishing’ (Franzen 2010: 567) rather 
than conservation). This personal happiness is hard won precisely because it is 
suspended within broader social, cultural and political questions that remain entirely 
fraught. As such, the novel’s happy ending, whilst unquestionably sincere and, as it 
were, earned, also feels provisional, tentative and self-conscious. Freedom does not 
allow itself a fantasy of negation, but it does work to refuse the false choice between 
‘the dream of limitless freedom’ and ‘misanthropy and rage’ (Franzen 2010: 473). 
 We can usefully distinguish between the politics in and the politics of a novel. 
What happens if we take this distinction to Freedom? Provocatively, Jon Baskin has 
suggested that Franzen’s novels ‘are political in the sense that they contain characters 
who remain passionate about politics. But to the extent that they emphasize the 
negative emotional consequences (and causes) of political conviction, they are anti-
political’ (Baskin 2012). ‘Anti-political’, of course, might mean a number of different 
things here; it might be taken to suggest the possibility of a contestation and 
redrawing of the political rather than its renunciation or abandonment. The moral to 
be drawn from this association, within Franzen’s fiction, between negative affect and 
the political, remains wholly open. Neither Freedom nor its characters, for instance, 
could sensibly be held to be in retreat from the political – although it is something one 
can feel about the novel, and something its characters might wish for; both might 
rather be said to withstand the political, as they withstand the emotional. Something 
of this is captured in the tone of Franzen’s essay, ‘Inauguration Day, January 2001’, a 
brief, second person account of his bus trip with young socialists and fellow travellers 
to Washington in order to protest Bush’s inauguration. Having worn an appropriate 
‘costume’ for the occasion, the ‘you’ of Franzen’s narrative returns home to find ‘a 
wholly different kind of costume hanging in your closet; and in the shower you’re 
naked and alone’ (Franzen [2002] 2004: 306). Selfhood here becomes a difficult 
remainder of the political. 
Baskin’s claim that ‘negative emotional consequences’ are presented by 
Franzen as not just effects but causes of political conviction is troubling; it might 
(though need not) be taken in a reductive sense, as the suggestion that political 
convictions are merely affective residues. Certainly, as Baskin suggests, the intimate 
connection between political belief and emotional suffering is under sustained 
scrutiny in Freedom. When he joins Walter in Washington to discuss his friend’s anti-
growth initiative, Katz is surprised less by the fact that his friend has become 
something of a political crank, since this was more or less predictable, and more ‘by 
what an angry crank Walter had become’ (Franzen 2010: 232). Spending a summer at 
his Mother’s lake house (‘secondhand paperback copy of Walden and Super-8 movie 
camera’ in hand (Franzen 2010: 483)), Walter’s solitude is brought to a halt by the 
arrival of his less transcendentally inclined brother, Mitch, who has friends and is not 
much interested in learning how to be alone:  
 he could hear the noise from half a mile away. Cock-rock guitar soloing, blunt 
drunken shouting, the dog baying, firecrackers, a motorcycle engine spluttering 
and screaming. […] He locked himself in the bedroom and lay in bed and let 
himself be tortured by the noise. Why couldn’t they be quiet? Why this need to 
sonically assault a world in which some people appreciated silence? The din 
went on and on. It produced a fever to which everyone else was apparently 
immune. A fever of self-pitying alienation. Which, as it raged in Walter that 
night, scarred him permanently with hatred of the bellowing vox populi, and 
also, curiously, with an aversion to the outdoor world. He’d come open-hearted 
to nature, and nature, in its weakness, which was like his mother’s weakness, 
had let him down. Had allowed itself so easily to be overrun by noisy idiots. He 
loved nature, but only abstractly […] Even when he left 3M to do conservation 
work, his primary interest in working for the Conservancy, and later for the 
Trust, was to safeguard pockets of nature from loutish country people like his 
brother. The love he felt for the creatures whose habitat he was protecting was 
founded on projection: on identification with their own wish to be left alone by 
noisy human beings. (Franzen 2010: 486) 
 
These are adolescent thoughts but thereby formative; the suggestion here as elsewhere 
in Freedom is that, put bluntly, Walter’s political convictions are abstractions bound 
up with misanthropy. What follows from this? If Walter’s ‘neurotic anger’ (Franzen 
2010: 521) and alienation inform his political sensibility, that need not discredit that 
sensibility outright as if in contamination; if negative affect is the mode within which 
the political appears, it may after all – to overwork the novel’s Thoreauvian pun – be 
preferable to ‘see more of bitternness and less of nothing’ (Franzen 2010: 484), a 
matter of finding an ‘enduringly discontented situation to struggle against and fashion 
an existence within’ (Franzen 2010: 529). 
Walter’s lifelong dislike of the noisy vox populi is apparent in his work with 
Vin Haven for the Cerulean Mountain Trust, as his initial encounters with local 
environmental groups wholly hostile to mountain top removal lead him to the 
realisation that ‘he simply couldn’t afford to take his full case to the public. The clock 
was ticking; there was no time for the slow work of educating the public and shaping 
its opinion’ (Franzen 2010: 340). Far better, as he tells Katz, ‘to turn to a few 
billionaires [such as Vin Haven] than to educate American voters who are perfectly 
happy with their cable and their Xboxes and their broadband’ (Franzen 2010: 226). A 
significant difficulty with Walter’s strategy and sentiment here, of course, is its 
uncomfortable if partial echo of elements of neoconservative thought, in particular the 
notion of the ‘noble lie’ as voiced in the novel by Jenna’s father: the Straussian 
suggestion, couched in Platonic terms, that the ‘blurry shadows’ cast on the cave wall 
by the media should be manipulated in the name of a ‘greater truth’ (Franzen 2010: 
284). 
Freedom suggests that the overcoming of isolating anger is both the condition 
of a liveable life and the one thing needed in a broader cultural and political terrain 
marked by enmity and rage. Organising ‘Free Space’ events with Lalitha, Walter is 
troubled to find himself ‘immersed in the rage that was gripping the country that 
summer’ (Franzen 2010: 525). If conservative rage is ‘mysterious’ to Walter given 
that the Republicans ‘controlled all three branches of federal government’ (Franzen 
2010: 525), he is no less alarmed by the way that this ‘conservative rage had 
engendered a left-wing counter-rage that practically scorched off his eyebrows at the 
Free Space events in Los Angeles and San Francisco. […] That 9/11 had been 
orchestrated by Halliburton and the Saudi royal family was near-universal article of 
faith’ (Franzen 2010: 525). Speaking at his Free Space anti-growth event, Walter 
finds himself applauded by his youthful audience only to the extent that he echoes his 
earlier ‘meltdown’ and provides ‘intemperate’ and ‘incendiary words’ – words that 
Freedom might nonetheless fully mean, of course (Franzen 2010: 525). His less 
glamorous leftist liberal emphasis that they should ‘be disciplined in their message … 
stick to the facts about overpopulation … stake out the biggest possible tent’ is met 
with either silence or a chanting of Walter’s anti-humanist environmentalist outburst, 
‘Cancer on the Planet!’ (Franzen 2010: 525). The oppressive thought, for Walter, is 
that ‘the country’s ugly rage was no more than an amplified echo of his own anger’ 
(Franzen 2010: 525). 
 Whilst several of Freedom’s characters, by the novel’s close, have as it were 
become characters by negotiating hard emotional truths that have in some way driven 
their political standpoints, thereby attaining a degree of calm, the political trembling 
that may be taken to characterise the novel still remains. This trembling is not exactly 
a form of political uncertainty, since the novel’s political diagnosis of Bush-era 
America is hardly characterised by hesitancy. The novel’s trembling, rather, relates to 
the efficacy of its liberal voice as represented by Walter. Indeed, the novel can be 
viewed as something of a case study in the felt difficulty of articulating a liberal 
position; the overlap in Freedom between political conviction and emotional strife 
emerges as a symptom of this difficulty. The first we hear of him in the novel, his old 
neighbours in St. Paul are struggling to reconcile unflattering descriptions of Walter – 
‘“arrogant’, “high-handed”, “ethically compromised”’ – in a report on his work for 
the Trust in the New York Times with their memories of a smiling, modest man 
‘greener than Greenpeace’ (Franzen 2010: 3). This reconciliation is well under way 
by the close of the novel’s first paragraph, disclosing as it does the collective 
neighbourly judgment that ‘there had always been something not quite right about the 
Berglunds’ (Franzen 2010: 3). The rest of the novel might be understood as a working 
through of this suggestion. 
The opening section of Freedom, ‘Good Neighbours’, rehearses the history of 
the Berglund family home in Ramsey Hill, St. Paul, from their arrival as ‘young 
pioneers’ of urban gentrification in the early 1980s to the sale of the house soon after 
9/11, as the Berglunds move to Washington for Walter’s work with the Trust 
(Franzen 2010: 3). The Berglunds’ liberalism is explored in some detail. They are 
presented as socio-culturally archetypal, at the vanguard of urban gentrification, 
thereby forced to relearn life skills that a previous generation ‘had fled to the suburbs 
specifically to forget’, such as ‘How to respond when a poor person of color accused 
you of destroying her neighborhood?’ (Franzen 2010: 4). Greif suggests that Freedom 
‘takes up a form of American liberalism that doesn’t yet have a name: liberalism as 
niceness’, tracing ‘the agony of liberalism-as-niceness in an era that publicly rejected 
it’ (Greif 2010: 124). Some of Patty’s neighbours question the character of her good 
neighbourliness, or niceness, finding her habitual self-deprecation to be a form of 
condescension, for instance, since designed to put less accomplished homemakers at 
ease. When the sixteen year-old Joey, as Walter puts it, ‘fires’ his parents and moves 
next door with the Monaghans, ‘everybody has the sense, fairly or not, that Walter – 
his niceness – was somehow to blame’ (Franzen 2010: 27). Memorably, Seth Paulsen 
deems the Berglunds to be ‘the super-guilty sort of liberals who needed to forgive 
everybody so their own good fortune could be forgiven; who lacked the courage of 
their own privilege’ (Franzen 2010: 7). Seth’s wife Merrie, however, refuses to see 
Patty’s good neighborliness as in any way progressive, deeming it instead ‘regressive 
housewifely bullshit’: ‘frankly, if you were to scratch below the nicey-nice surface 
you might be surprised to find something rather hard and Reaganite in Patty’ (Franzen 
2010: 8). 
The attractiveness of the Republican Party to Joey is also presented in terms of 
a disputation of the nature of liberal niceness. Again, the political is bound up with the 
personal and emotional: anger at his mother’s unfairness and condescension to his 
girlfriend, Connie (daughter of ‘the only non-gentrifier left’ (Franzen 2010: 7) on the 
Berglunds’ block) leads ‘in a roundabout way’ to his sense of allegiance with ‘the 
party of angry anti-snobbism’: ‘What Joey liked about the Republicans was that they 
didn’t disdain people the way liberal Democrats did. [...] They were simply sick of 
the kind of unexamined condescension with which his mother treated the Monaghans’ 
(Franzen 2010: 417). Freedom is much interested in the functioning and significance 
of this ‘roundabout way’, of the entwining and co-articulation of the personal and the 
political. As Marco Roth notes, Freedom ‘holds the forces that govern our messy 
human lives and the forces that govern messy human societies in equal and 
unresolvable tension, without reducing one to the terms of the other. […] This 
sustained irresolution drives the novel’ (Roth 2010: 123). This is part of what makes 
Franzen’s mode of perennial fiction both difficult and self-conscious – its return to 
character and emotion after the flat and affectless tendencies of postmodern fiction is 
less comforting than might at first appear, since these characters are in any case 
neither untroubled nor autonomous agents. The novel’s tentative resolution, precisely 
because, like the novel as a whole, it expresses political discord in domestic, familial 
terms but refuses to fully reduce it to those terms, leaves both the novel and its 
characters irredeemably caught up in ‘the insane making, velocitous world’ (Franzen 
2010: 341). The roundabout relationship between the political and the personal is 
expressed by the novel’s tendency to picture the personal as structuring the political 
no less than vice versa: it feels to Joey as if he and his father have chosen their 
political allegiances in order to disagree with one another, but it can never quite be as 
simple as that. Walter’s sadness is at once ‘a world sadness, a life sadness’ (Franzen 
2010: 513).  
A further way in which the novel is self-conscious is that it refuses what 
Franzen takes to be one of the presuppositions of realism, ‘that the author has access 
to truth.’ As Franzen puts the matter, realist fiction:  
 
implies a superiority of the author to his or her comically blundering characters. 
[…] In Freedom, the recurrent metaphor is sleepwalking. Not that you’re 
deceiving yourself – you’re simply asleep, not paying attention, you’re in some 
sort of dream state. The Corrections was preoccupied with the unreal, wilfully 
self-deceptive worlds we make for ourselves to live in. […] And the realist 
writer can play a useful and entertaining role in violently breaking the spell. But 
something about the position this puts the writer in, as a possessor of truth, as an 
epistemological enforcer, has come to make me uncomfortable. I’ve become 
more interested in joining the characters in their dream, and experiencing it with 
them, and less interested in the mere fact that it’s a dream. (Burn 2010) 
 
If Freedom’s characters are still figuring out how to live, then, this is not entirely a 
case of their stumbling towards a truth or truths already evident to the author or the 
reader. Walter’s political trembling, for instance, matches that of the novel, since both 
express the difficulty of being liberal in a period fairly dominated by conservative 
voices. It is telling that in one of the novel’s key scenes – Walter’s Whitmanville rant, 
which captures the capaciousness of Walt Whitman’s poetry but delivers only discord 
rather than democratic unity –Walter seems to morph into an entertainer of sorts, 
‘wresting the mike from its holder and dancing away with it’ (Franzen 2010: 514), an 
entertainer who repels his immediate audience only to find internet fame. The way 
that Walter’s jeremiad assumes something of a giddy, comic mode here is 
reminiscent, in a sense, of the role of television programmes such as The Daily Show 
during Bush-era America: offering a haven for liberal thought and leftist satire but 
combining certainty with a form of powerlessness, marked and potentially limited by 
what Franzen refers to in his ‘Inauguration Day’ essay as the pleasure of being ‘in 
violent agreement’ (Franzen 2002: 306). 
Just how much of a crank is Walter, and to what extent does Freedom join him 
in his dream – how much of crank does the novel take him to be? For a time, before 
his work with the Cerulean Mountain Trust, he is kept awake at night by worries over 
fragmentation: ‘it’s the same problem everywhere. It’s like the internet, or cable TV – 
there’s never any center, there’s no communal agreement, there’s just a trillion bits of 
distracting noise. We can never sit down and have any kind of sustained conversation, 
it’s all just cheap trash and shitty development. All the real things, the authentic 
things, the honest things are dying off. Intellectually and culturally, we just bounce 
around like random billiard balls, reacting to the latest random stimuli’ (Franzen 
2010: 232). It is hard not to align this sentiment not only with Franzen’s own 
jeremiads but also with his subsequent, self-aware recalibration of the scope and tone 
of their argument (‘I used to be a very angry and theory-minded person. I used to 
consider it apocalyptically worrisome that Americans watch a lot of TV and don’t 
read much Henry James’ (Franzen 2002: 4)). Katz’s deflationary, comic rejoinder to 
Walter’s worries over fragmentation (‘“There’s some pretty good porn on the 
internet”’) does little to settle the question of Walter’s crankiness, because it feels too 
much like a gesture of embarrassment on the novel’s part and somehow more stilted 
than the over-earnestness it might otherwise interrupt (Franzen 2010: 232). In his 
ongoing attempt to figure out ‘how to live’, Walter feels the absence of a ‘controlling 
narrative’ (Franzen 2010: 338). Freedom is open both about its wish to provide such a 
narrative and about its inability to do so – the novel’s question – how to live? – 
captures the difficulty of giving existential content to liberal procedural norms. 
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